on the following five fundamentals: the inerrancy of the Bible, the deity of Jesus Christ, the Virgin Birth, Christ's substitutionary atonement, and his physical resurrection and future bodily return. Christians espousing these fundamentals came to be called fundamentalists.
The list just given illustrates how difficult it is to specify the essentials. Drawn up in opposition to liberalism and modernism, fundamentalism represented the particular perspective of one group of Christians, speaking in a time-conditioned situation. Christians of other traditions would have drawn up a markedly different list of fundamentals. The majority would have insisted on the Trinity, the Holy Spirit, the true humanity of Jesus Christ, the primacy of grace, the divine origin of the Church, and the value of the sacraments-all of which are missing from the fundamentalist syllabus. Nearly every major Christian community, in fact, would favor a somewhat different list. Lutherans would presumably want to highlight justification by faith and perhaps, in some sense, the sufficiency of Scripture. Episcopalians would insist on the episcopal office and the early creeds; the Orthodox, on tradition and the Eucharist; and Roman Catholics, on the papacy.
In Mortalium ánimos, an encyclical published in 1928, Pius XI rejected the very idea of distinguishing between fundamental and nonfundamental articles. 5 The assent of faith, he declared, since it is motivated by the authority of God the revealer, must extend without distinction to everything that is divinely revealed and contained in the deposit of faith. Church unity, according to the Pope, could never be achieved through subscription to a limited number of fundamental articles.
Mortalium ánimos, however, was not the last word from the Catholic side. At Vatican Council II, on Nov. 25, 1963, Archbishop Andrea Pangrazio of Gorizia, Italy, made a speech in which he observed: "Even though all revealed truths are to be believed with the same divine faith and all constitutive elements of the Church maintained with the same loyalty, nevertheless not all receive and hold the same status." 6 Incorporating the substance of Pangrazio's intervention, the Decree on Ecumenism called attention to the fact that there exists a certain hierarchy of importance among church doctrines "since they vary in their relationship to the foundation of the Christian faith" (UR 11). The Decree went on to exhort all. Christians to profess before the whole world their faith in God, one and three, and in the incarnate Son of God, our Redeemer and Lord. The Council was here clearly suggesting that the dogmas of the Trinity and the Incarnation are central and foundational for Christianity. Happily, too, these primary doctrines are widely shared by Christians of many different churches and confessional traditions.
As a third thesis or principle, then, we may state that there is a hierarchy of importance in Christian doctrines, the most central being those Trinitarian and Christological dogmas which are presumably accepted by the vast majority of Christians. In view of the greater importance of these foundational truths, we may surmise that the agreements among Christians are, generally speaking, more significant than their disagreements.
IMPERFECT COMMUNION
The acknowledgment by Vatican II that there is a graded hierarchy of truths, while it did not lead to the conclusion that certain dogmas could be regarded as optional, nevertheless had important ecumenical consequences. The Council was able to recognize that Christian communion extends beyond the juridical frontiers of any given ecclesial body, including the Roman Catholic Church. Ecclesial communion includes a real and significant fellowship between Christians of different confessional allegiances. As Yves Congar has noted, the ecumenism of Vatican II is based on an ecclesiology of imperfect communion, which is in need of being further developed.
7 According to the Decree on Ecumenism, all baptized believers are somehow incorporated in Christ (UR 22). All who believe and are baptized in the name of the triune God "are brought into a certain, though imperfect, communion with the Catholic Church" {UR 3). Paul VI would later declare that the Orthodox churches are "in almost complete communion" with the Catholic Church.
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This doctrine of ecclesial communion has implications for Eucharistie sharing. Vatican II looked upon the Eucharist not simply as a sign of achieved unity but as a sign of limited existing unity and as a means for greater unity {UR 8). According to the Council, the ecclesial communion between Catholics and Orthodox, although still imperfect, is sufficiently rich so that common worship may occasionally be appropriate (OE 27-29). The Council, while obviously holding that a measure of communion exists between Catholics and Protestants, did not attempt to specify whether and under what circumstances Eucharistie sharing between these groups would be permissible. The present (1983) Code of Canon Law provides for the administration of the sacraments of penance, Eucharist, and the anointing of the sick to Protestants in situations of grave need under conditions which are to be further specified by the local 
NONCONDEMNATION OF DOCTRINES
Most theologians have assumed that such assent is required, but a different view has been advanced by Karl Rahner. In several recent books and articles he argues that, among churches that affirm the Scriptures and the early creeds, union can be effected as soon as each of the partner churches agrees not to condemn the binding doctrines of the other as contrary to the gospel. He further asserts that such an agreement is attainable today, and that therefore God is calling the mainline churches to union at the present time.
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The Rahner proposal raises two major questions. First, is it true that the churches are prepared to refrain from condemning each other's doctrines? Secondly, if they take this step, does it suffice for reunion?
From the Catholic side, I suspect that the first of these questions can be answered in the affirmative. The Orthodox churches, so far as I am aware, teach nothing today as binding doctrine which they did not teach before the breaches of the tenth and eleventh centuries, and hence nothing that the Catholic Church needs to anathematize. As for the Protestant churches, they impose very few obligatory doctrines on their members. The Reformation watchwords, sola scriptum, sola fide, and sola gratia, deeply ingrained in many branches of Protestantism, are practically equivalent to binding dogmas. But these watchwords can bear an authentically Catholic interpretation. Many contemporary Catholic theologians, including Rahner himself, have written at length on the primacy of Scripture, faith, and grace in the Catholic understanding of Christianity.
12 I would agree that these principles can be understood in a Catholic sense, and therefore need not be repudiated by the Catholic Church. But I also think that these principles can be interpreted as denying the Catholic doctrines of tradition, good works, and merit. Thus the principles cannot be accepted without qualification.
Bypassing of this Western theological theorem into the creed. This position gives rise to the hope that the chief historic barrier to reunion between the Eastern and Western churches might be able to be overcome.
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The Orthodox, however, have difficulties with other Catholic dogmas, especially those promulgated since the definitive separation in the eleventh century. It is therefore important to look for ways in which dogmas such as papal infallibility and papal primacy of jurisdiction can be ecumenically handled so as to permit doctrinal reconciliation.
Finally, we must ask whether Protestants are in a position to admit the legitimacy of all the Roman Catholic dogmas. In the dialogues of the past 20 years, the Anglicans and Lutherans have greatly moderated their opposition to the pope, formerly depicted as Antichrist, and to the Sacrifice of the Mass. Many seem inclined to regard the Catholic forms of devotion to Mary and the saints as permissible rather than idolatrous. Thus they might be in a position to declare that no binding dogma of the Catholic Church is downright opposed to the gospel.
A typically Lutheran reaction to the Rahner proposal is that of Eberhard Júngel.
14 The Roman dogmas, he observes, have at certain times been interpreted by Catholics themselves as excluding the Lutheran doctrine of justification by faith in Christ alone. Under such circumstances a status confessioni^ arises, calling for prophetic denunciation. But Catholics have recently expounded these dogmas in ways compatible with the gospel of free grace. These dogmas may therefore be tolerated by Lutherans, even though not positively affirmed. Reactions such as Jüngel's give hope that Protestants might be able to accept this aspect of the Rahner proposal.
Our second question about the proposal is whether, if given, the statement by each uniting church that the binding doctrines of the others are not manifestly opposed to the gospel provides a sufficient basis for union. From a Lutheran perspective, Harding Meyer indicates that it would be necessary for each church to grant that the doctrines of the others are legitimate interpretations of the gospel-which is something more than not being evidently opposed to the gospel. 15 
16
" Anyone who is in union with the Catholic Church, he maintains, must accept the divine authority of the Church's teaching office, which is fully engaged in the proclamation of dogmas. To doubt or deny the truth of a dogma is, in effect, to reject the Church's teaching authority and thus to separate oneself from its communion. Ols's position on this point resembles that of Pius XI in response to fiindamentalism.
16b I can agree with 01s only subject to various qualifications that will appear in my last four theses.
To as a condition for reunion? In replying to this question, one should bear in mind that many dogmas are to be understood less as positive declarations of the content of revelation than as rejections of errors prevalent at a certain time. Once the danger of adhering to the heretical party is past, the dogma may perhaps be allowed to pass into a certain benign neglect. If similar threats to the faith arise in the future, the dogma will be resuscitated in a form directed against the new error.
When one looks over the lists of propositions drawn up by the Catholic magisterium against the Origenists in the 6th century, or against Peter Abelard in the 11th, or against the Lutherans in the 16th, or against the Janséniste in the 17th, or against the Modernists at the beginning of our own century, one finds many propositions that sound, to our contemporary ears, rather harmless. Much the same could no doubt be said by many Lutherans and Calviniste when they contemplate the lists of propositions condemned by their forebears in the 16th and 17th centuries. Today we are perhaps in a position to say that the state of emergencyor, in Lutheran terminology, the status confessionis-that prompted these declarations has subsided. What is today required is the integral confession of the Christian faith in a manner opposed to the errors to which we ourselves are tempted.
For whatever reasons, rather subtle points of doctrine have been defined at certain points in the past. The Council of Vienne, in the 14th century, felt it necessary to teach under anathema that the human soul is the substantial form of the body (DS 902).
16 Today this highly metaphysical doctrine might suitably receive less emphasis, and in practice it does. Some have suggested that a dogma such as the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin, since it is relatively remote from the center of Christian faith and lacks clear warrants in Scripture and in early Christian tradition, does not need to be taught under anathema.
17 Whatever one may think of this or other examples, at least the principle may be allowed, that certain doctrinal concessions may be made for the sake of unity. As Congar has shown, Athanasius, Basil, and Cyril of Alexandria appealed to the principle of economy, as they called it, in allowing for some doctrinal lenience.
18 Already in New Testament times, the Council of Jerusalem laid down the principle: "It has seemed good to the Holy Spirit and us to lay upon you no greater burden than necessary" (Acts 
15:28). Vatican II, in its Decree on Ecumenism, alluded to this text and drew the consequence that "in order to restore communion and unity or preserve them, one must impose no burden beyond what is indispensable" (UR 18)
. As a seventh thesis, then, I suggest that in the interests of unity the churches should insist only on the doctrinal minimum required for a mature and authentic Christian faith, and that doctrines formulated in response to past historical crises should be carefully reviewed to see whether they must be imposed as tests of orthodoxy today. nus; in the case of the Lutheran churches, the Augsburg Confession; in the case of the Orthodox Church, Palamism; and these are only examples. These doctrines have been "received," that is to say, the churches recognize their heritage in them and have lived according to them. It is not a matter of abandoning them but of restoring them in the fullness and balance of the biblical witness, what T. Sartory calls "a repatriation of dogmas in the light of the overall witness of Holy Scripture"; it is a matter of thinking them and living them out, taking account of the knowledge we have acquired of the historical, cultural, and sociological conditioning of the decision in question, of the current needs of the cause of the gospel which we seek to serve, of the values accumulated since the first reception of the decision or doctrine, and finally of the criticisms and valuable contributions received from others.
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In a recent work, The Nature of Doctrine, the American Lutheran theologian George Lindbeck distinguishes three types of theory concerning doctrines: first, that they are informative propositions or truth claims about objective realities; secondly, that they are noninformative and nondiscursive symbols of inner feelings, attitudes, or existential orientations; and thirdly, that they are communally authoritative rules of discourse, attitude, and action. 23 Rejecting the first two theories, Lindbeck adopts almost exclusively the third, or regulative, theory. Although I suspect that Lindbeck unduly minimizes the cognitive and expressive import of doctrines, his analysis is helpful for calling attention to the role of doctrine in shaping the religious orientations of the communities that accept them. In this context he is able to show that controversial theology has in the past reckoned insufficiently with the cultural and linguistic components of religious discourse. The formulas of one church or tradition are often misinterpreted, or simply not understood, by believers of other traditions, whose experiences have been shaped by a different set of symbols.
Nearly all who have been involved in ecumenical dialogue could certify the difficulty of explaining to members of another confessional body the traditional formulations of one's own. Lutherans, for example, must use extreme care to explain what they mean by the "gospel" and "justification by faith alone," so that Catholics do not misunderstand them, while Catholics have to struggle long and hard to prevent Lutherans from caricaturing the real meaning of terms such as "transubstantiation" and papal "infallibility." Through patient dialogue it is often possible to reinterpret such terms in ways that render them intelligible, tolerable, or even acceptable to communities that previously rejected them. In the course of the dialogue each community deepens and refînes its own experience, reflection, and expression. This process illustrates what Ratzinger seems to mean by the "hermeneutics of unity" and Congar by "re-reception." As an eighth thesis, then, we may affirm: Through reinterpretation in a broader hermeneutical context, the limitations of controverted doctrinal formulations can often be overcome, so that they gain wider acceptability.
DOCTRINAL PLURALISM
One possible result of the "hermeneutics of unity" is a joint reformulation acceptable to different parties in the diaglogue. But sometimes it does not seem possible to find a single formula that does justice to the experiences and insights of both parties. We must consider whether in this second case the parties must continue to disagree.
I should like to propose as a ninth thesis the following: In some cases substantive agreement can be reached between two parties without the imposition of identical doctrinal formulations on each.
If this Another case in point is provided by the Council of Florence, which in 1439 declared that the Greek formulation according to which the Holy Spirit proceeds "from the Father through the Son" is equivalent to the Latin formulation that the Spirit proceeds "from the Father and the Son" (DS 1301). Regrettably, however, the Council of Florence seemed to interpret the first of these formulas, contrary to the intention of the Greek Fathers, as though it gave causal efficacy to the Son, and thus its conclusions were perceived in the East as a capitulation to the Latin position. Contemporary theologians such as Congar, addressing the question of the Filioque in terms of a more sophisticated epistemology, hold that the mystery of the divine processions eludes adequate statement in any dogmatic formula. Appealing to the authority of Hilary and Thomas Aquinas, Congar asserts that no one expression is adequate to express the mystery apprehended in faith. 24 After an excursus on the theory of complementarity advanced by the physicist Niels Bohr, Congar applies the theory to the theology of the Trinity: are two constructions of the mystery, each of which is coherent and completealthough each is unsatisfactory at some point-and which cannot be superimposed. It is a case for applying Bohr's saying, "The opposite of a true statement is a false statement, but the opposite of a profound truth can be another profound truth." The equivalence affirmed by the Council of Florence between dia tou huiou and Filioque is not really adequate. More than theology is at stake here. As Fr. Dejaifve has noted, it is at the level of dogma that the two constructions are to be found. However, these are two constructions of the mystery experienced by the same faith.
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The Vatican II Decree on Ecumenism suggested the possibility of a certain dogmatic pluralism. It remarked that the differing theological formulations of the Eastern and Western Churches "are often to be considered as complementary rather than conflicting" (UR 17). It is not surprising, said the Council, "if sometimes one tradition has come nearer than the other to an apt appreciation of certain aspects of the revealed mystery" (ibid.). Doctrinal agreement, therefore, need not take the form of a submission by one group to the .formulated positions of the other. It may occur by means of a mutual recognition of the complementarity of formulas that cannot be reduced to a common conceptual denominator.
If the mutual complementarity of the Eastern and Western formulations is recognized, both can be tolerated in the Church. It might therefore be unnecessary for the Western Church in our time to insist on the Filioque, which was added to the creed in the Middle Ages partly to guard against certain Arian distortions then current. Congar and Fries, among others, have proposed that if the Eastern Churches would concede that the Filioque is not heretical, the Western Church could withdraw it; for the creed should be acceptable to all who hold the same faith, even though they must not conceptualize it according to the Western tradition. Congar and Fries, however, add that before any such change in the creed is made, the faithful should be pastorally prepared to accept the change. We have no antecedent certainty that we shall reach the ultimate goal of our ecumenical pilgrimage before the end of historical time. We have the strength to believe, however, that the Holy Spirit is leading us toward a greater measure of unity in the truth. As we allow ourselves to be led by this dynamism, we can enjoy a certain foretaste of the promised goal.
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Every step toward doctrinal agreement increases the communion among Christians and diminishes the scandal arising from their mutual opposition. The dialogue itself assists the churches to correct their own onesidedness and to achieve a richer and more balanced grasp of the revelation to which they bear witness. For these results, it is not essential that final reconciliation be achieved. The ecumenical effort pays off in rich rewards at every stage of the way. 
